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PREFACE
On A p r i l  18th, 1977, the Montana Senate approved funding fo r  
the Homestead R e lie f  Act. Approval ensured the operation o f the 
property tax r e l i e f  proposal fo r  a t leas t one year o f the 1977-79 
biennium. The events which preceded the vote spanned a four year 
period and encompassed a wide array o f p a r t ic ip a n ts ,  inc lud ing the 
e lec to ra te  o f Montana.
The h is to ry  o f the Homestead R e lie f  Act represents s a l ie n t  Issues 
fo r  the s ta te  of Montana’ s f is c a l  process. This professional paper 
is  a case analysis o f  those events and examines possible im p lica tions 
fo r  the s ta te 's  budgetary process and the p o l i t i c a l  fu tures o f par­
t ic ip a n ts .
This paper grew out o f  independent study which examined the paths 
o f the Homestead R e lie f  Act and the Property Tax Replacement Act through 
the 1977 Montana le g is la t iv e  session and the s ta te 's  budgetary process.
111
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CHAPTER I
CASE STUDY;
THE HOMESTEAD PROPERTY TAX RELIEF ACT 
AND THE STATE BUDGETARY PROCESS
On January 5» 1977, in  accordance w ith  A r t ic le  6, Section 9 o f 
the C onstitu t ion  o f Montana , Governor Thomas L. Judge transm itted 
to the 45th le g is la t iv e  assembly the 1977-79 b ienn ia l executive budget 
recommendations fo r  s ta te  government. The governor unveiled what he 
termed "a taxpayer's budget, pared to a bare minimum, ye t adequately
2
addressing the problems facing Montana during the upcoming biennium."
The proposed executive budget ca lled  fo r  record expenditures o f 
$1.9 b i l l i o n  o f s ta te  and federal funds in the 1977-79 biennium. The 
governor advised members o f the le g is la tu re  tha t the proposed a l l ­
funds biennium budget o f $1.87 b i l l i o n  would be 15 percent la rger than 
the 1975-77 budget o f  $1.63 b i l l i o n  w ithout being in f la t io n a r y . Governor 
Judge estimated tha t federal funds would provide about $500 m i l l io n  o f 
the 1977-79 budget, or s l ig h t ly  more than one-fourth o f the governmental 
expenditures he wanted the le g is la to rs  to approve. Judge said his 
budget, i f  accepted, would h a lt  the growth o f s ta te government and 
a c tu a l ly  reduce the number of s ta te  employees, while necessita ting 
no personal tax increases in  the two years of the biennium. The gen­
eral -fund portion  o f  the executive budget--the an tic ipa ted  cash revenue 
which the le g is la tu re  must o f f i c i a l l y  a l lo ca te ,  in  accordance w ith
1
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Section 79-415, Revised Codes o f  Montana, 1947 --amounted to $448.6 
m i l l io n .  Thus, the executive budget proposed a 26 percent increase 
in  the general-fund po rt ion . The governor a t t r ib u te d  the increase to 
the d ire c t  a l lo c a t io n  o f general-fund monies fo r  the property tax 
r e l i e f  i n i t i a t i v e  approved by the Montana e lec to ra te  in  the November 2, 
1976 general e le c t io n ,  and fo r  the e lim ina tion  o f the statewide per­
missive levy fo r  pub lic  schools. The executive stated th a t ,  excluding 
those two d ire c t  a l lo c a t io n s ,  the general-fund operating budget fo r  the 
new biennium would be only 12 percent higher than fo r  the 1975-77 b ien­
nium. The governor concluded tha t the proposed executive budget provided 
$61.4 m i l l io n  in  d i re c t  property tax r e l i e f . ^
Thomas Judge had emphasized the need fo r  property tax r e l i e f  in  
his successful campaign fo r  a second term as Montana's governor, and 
the Homestead R e lie f  Act became almost a running mate fo r  the governor 
during the campaign. On the eve of the 45th session, the governor 
termed the Homestead R e lie f  Act, and the plan to fund i t  w ith  a general 
fund surplus, an expression o f the people's desire fo r  property tax 
r e l i e f .  The "State Funded Homestead Tax R e lie f  A c t" ,  I n i t i a t i v e  72, 
had been backed by a decis ive popular vote the November before. The 
in i t i a t i v e  carried  every Montana county; 71 percent o f q u a l i f ie d  e lec to rs  
voting indicated th e i r  approval and 204,532 persons favored the proposal. 
Governor Judge contended tha t no longer could the Homestead R e lie f  Act 
be ca lled  his proposal, since the measure had received th a t 71 percent 
p lu r a l i t y .  He ins is ted  tha t the message embodied in  the re su lts  o f  the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
e le c t ion  must be in te rp re ted  as a mandate from the people, and he 
d irec ted  the le g is la tu re  on the eve o f the session to consider tha t 
popular expression.
Montana's concern w ith  the re v is io n  o f the property tax c e r ta in ly  
has been shared by a l l  o f  the f i f t y  s ta tes. According to  the Advisory 
Commission on Intergovernmental Rela tions, as o f 1975 a l l  states had 
some type o f  property tax r e l i e f  program--either a state-mandated re ­
duction in va luation fo r  special groups or s ta te  authorized but lo c a l ly
5
financed programs. And in  1976, 16 states raised th e i r  e x is t in g  
property tax r e l i e f  programs by e i th e r  expanding or l ib e r a l iz in g  re ­
ductions in payments or exemptions from the property ta x .^  Montana, 
through I n i t ia t i v e  72, represented one o f  the 16 states undertaking 
steps to reduce the property tax burden. Although Montana is  but one 
o f many states concerned w ith  the problems o f the property tax , Montana 
is  unique, according to  the Montana Department o f Revenue Legal Devision, 
in  the use o f d i re c t ,  c i t i z e n - in i t ia te d  property tax le g is la t io n .  The 
fa c t  tha t many states in 1976 did not have a general-fund surplus com­
parable to Montana's^ accents the s ta te 's  enviable p o s it io n . Yet 
Montana is  c e r ta in ly  not the only s ta te  to accumulate a general-fund 
surplus, and obviously not the only s ta te  to engage in  property tax 
r e l i e f  measures. Montana does stand alone in proposing property tax 
r e l i e f  through d i r e c t ,  c i t ize n -vo te d  r e l i e f ,  using a general-fund surplus 
as the source o f  the rebate. The fa c t  tha t the s ta te  pursued such 
unique means to provide property tax r e l i e f ,  when many other a lte rn a t ive s
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
are ava ila b le , caused considerable controversy throughout the 45th 
le g is la t iv e  session.
As the 45th Montana Leg is la tu re  began d e l ib e ra t io n s ,  the governor 
spelled out what he wanted in terms o f property tax r e l i e f  le g is la t io n  
in  his State o f the State address. He pointed out tha t although Montana 
ranked 40th among the 50 states in  a l l  taxes co llec ted  per cap ita , the 
s tate ranked 6th in  property taxes lev ied  per cap ita . Judge said s ta te  
government only receives less than 5 percent o f  property tax revenues, 
but i t  is  the s ta te 's  re s p o n s ib i l i ty  to insure th a t  a b i l i t y  to  pay is  
maintained as the p reva il in g  p r in c ip le  o f  equ itab le  taxation  among a l l  
p o l i t i c a l  ju r is d ic t io n s  w ith in  i t s  boundaries. The governor contended 
tha t the property tax c o n f l ic te d  w ith  tha t p r in c ip le .  He maintained 
in his State o f  the State address tha t i f  the le g is la tu re  accepted his 
proposed budget, inc lud ing  $31.8 m i l l io n  to e lim ina te  the statewide 
permissive levy fo r  pub lic  schools, w ith  over h a l f  th a t amount coming 
from the s ta te 's  federal revenue-sharing funds, there would be no 
statewide property taxes fo r  support o f  pub lic  schools in  Montana during 
the two years o f  the biennium. The governor then ca lled  upon the le g is ­
la tu re  to appropriate $3.5 m i l l io n  from sta te  income tax surcharge 
revenues fo r  sharing w ith  local governments which might be hurt by 
property tax l im i ta t io n s .  This property tax r e l i e f  plan had cons titu ted  
Thomas Judge's number one campaign pledge, and he o ffered the Homestead 
R e lie f  Act as the beginning o f  permanent property tax r e l i e f  in  Montana 
(adding tha t every b ienn ia l le g is la tu re  would have to continue to provide
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
funding to keep the program going). The governor stated tha t th is  means 
o f  r e l i e f  would begin to redress the imbalance facing re s id e n t ia l  
property owners who have been held d isp ropo rt iona te ly  responsible fo r  
support o f  Montana school systems and loca l governments.
Therefore, the 1977 Montana Leg is la tu re  opened w ith  property tax 
rev is ion  as one o f the key points on i t s  agenda. To proponents o f  the 
Homestead R e lie f  Act, the measure's impressive v ic to ry  a t the po lls  
meant tha t the 45th Leg is la tu re  was obligated to appropriate the needed 
funds. However, the governor's contention th a t  the Homestead R e lie f  
Act's  funding should be in  the " le g is la t iv e  bag" because the people 
had registered th e i r  approval o f  the measure created le g is la t iv e  waves.
Thomas Judge had p r e v i o u s l y  backed two property tax r e l i e f  measures 
in  the le g is la tu re ;  SB 312 in 1974,^ and SB 11 in 1975^. The Montana 
Senate re jected both, w ith  SB 312 going down by a r o l l  c a l l  vote o f 
36-5 and SB 11 los ing 48-0. In the f a l l  o f  1976, the governor made the 
decision to conduct an i n i t i a t i v e  campaign (under provis ions o f  A r t ic le  3, 
Section 4 o f the Montana c o n s t i tu t io n ) .^ ^  Governor Judge d irected the 
formation o f the i n i t i a t i v e  committee, the C itizens For Property Tax 
R e lie f ,  and on January 2, 1976, the campaign began to  secure the 15,938 
signatures o f reg is tered voters needed on p e t i t io n s  proposing s ta tu to ry  
changes in Montana. Although Governor Judge did not p a r t ic ip a te  d i r ­
e c t ly  in  the i n i t i a t i v e  campaign in  an o f f i c ia l  capacity , he in fo rm a lly  
coordinated the committee's e f fo r ts  to secure c i t iz e n  s u p p o r t . T h e  
campaign produced 16,251 signatures by the deadline date, three months
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before the date o f  the e le c t io n ,  and I n i t i a t i v e  72 o f f i c i a l l y  became
1 7part o f  the November 2nd b a l lo t .
The b a l lo t  submitted to  the q u a l i f ie d  e lec to rs  o f Montana included
t i t l e  and te x t o f the i n i t i a t i v e ,  w ith  the fo llow ing  words:
For reduction o f owner's property tax l i a b i l i t y  on 
owner-occupied re s id e n t ia l property.
Against reduction o f  owner's property tax l i a b i l i t y  
on owner-occupied re s id e n t ia l  property.
Voters approved the i n i t i a t i v e  and the State Funded Homestead Tax R e lie f  
Act became law. However, the i n i t i a t i v e  did not, by i t s e l f ,  reduce 
property taxes on each owner-occupied home. I n i t i a t i v e  72 did not place 
an a f f irm a t iv e  duty on the le g is la tu re  to fund the proposal. Since 
A r t ic le  3, Section 4 of the Montana co n s t i tu t io n  spec if ies  tha t the 
people may not enact laws by i n i t i a t i v e  fo r  appropria tions o f money, 
and A r t ic le  9, Section 14 spec if ies  only the le g is la tu re  may appropriate 
m o n e y s , t h e  Homestead R e lie f  Act merely provided tha t " to  the extent 
funds are provided by the le g is la tu re "  property tax r e l i e f  would be fo r t h ­
coming. In e f fe c t ,  th is  meant tha t should the le g is la tu re  have refused 
to appropriate funds fo r  th is  purpose, ne ither the governor nor sta te  
taxpayers would have had any legal recourse to  obtain s ta te  funds.
Although they had no legal recourse, supporters of the i n i t i a t i v e  
could pursue avenues o f p o l i t i c a l  recourse. To avoid the le g is la tu re 's  
refusal to fund the measure, proponents brought numerous pressures to 
bear upon le g is la to rs  balking a t the proposal or e n te rta in ing  hopes fo r  
a l te rn a t iv e  measures. Governor Thomas Judge, an aggressive defender o f 
the r e l i e f  proposal, served as a c a ta ly s t  fo r  those pressures.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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The sta te  c o n s t i tu t io n  provides the governor o f  Montana w ith  a 
powerful executive p o licy  too l w ith  which to  p a r t ic ip a te  in the budgetary 
process. The executive budget {Art. 6, Sec. 9) and the item veto (Art. 6, 
Sec. 10) co n s t itu te  tha t powerful p o l icy  instrument. The governor o f 
Montana is  required to  submit w ith  an explanatory message an itemized 
budget o f  recommended sta te  expenditures and estimated revenues. The 
governor is  empowered to  obtain in formation from sta te  agencies, em­
ployees, and o f f ic e rs .  The executive is  permitted to reduce one or more 
items o f appropria t ion , while approving other portions o f  the b i l l .  An 
extraord inary m a jo r ity  o f tw o -th irds  o f the membership o f  the le g is la tu re  
is  required to override the item veto.^®
Thus, the governor o f Montana is  provided w ith  planning and con­
t r o l  devices analogous to  those of the President o f  the United States, 
and the governor is  fu r th e r  endowed w ith  the nearly in v in c ib le  "blue 
penc il"  to  veto sp e c if ic  budget items. Through the O ff ice  o f Budget 
and Program Planning, the governor receives, reviews, and amalgamates 
the budget which is  presented as the governor’ s own. The le g is la tu re  
is  free  to amend and revise the governor's requests, but the item veto 
discourages s ig n i f ic a n t  le g is la t iv e  i n i t i a t i v e  in th is  respect. In the 
past, attempts to override the governor's item veto have been in f r e ­
quent owing to d i f f i c u l t i e s  in  securing the needed tw o-th irds  support. 
Thus, the executive budget and the item veto give the Montana governor 
considerable f in a n c ia l i n i t i a t i v e  in  the s ta te 's  f is c a l  process.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Therefore, the Homestead R e lie f  Act assumed the unique pos it ion  o f:  
{ ] )  being supported by the governor who possessed the f in a n c ia l i n i -  
ta t iv e  c ite d  above; and (2) having garnered a 71 percent p lu r a l i t y  in 
the state-w ide e le c t io n . And although only the le g is la tu re  is  con­
s t i t u t io n a l ly  charged w ith  the power o f appropria t ion , these two points 
would prove to be i r r e s t ib le  forces given the way in  which the governor 
used the two-pronged attack to secure needed funding. The governor's 
aggressive support, coupled w ith  the successful i n i t i a t i v e  campaign, 
provided the needed momentum fo r  le g is la t iv e  funding; ye t the nature of 
the governor's actions in supporting the measure and pressuring le g is ­
la to rs  to do the same engendered adverse reactions. Substantive 
c r i t ic is m s  became f o r t i f i e d  w ith  th a t p o l i t i c a l  backlash.
The substantive c r i t ic is m s  began when the le g is la tu re 's  c h ie f  f is c a l  
analyst stated th a t the governor's 1977-79 budget would not provide any 
overa ll net property tax r e l i e f .  The f is c a l  analyst made his property 
tax observations in  an analysis o f the executive budget, in accordance
17
with section 43-1114, Revised Codes o f  Montana, 1947. The analysis 
represented the f i r s t  comprehensive review o f an executive budget in  
Montana. In 1975, the le g is la tu re  established the f is c a l  ana lys t 's  
pos it ion  as a means to provide a review o f  the executive budget. Legis­
la to rs  believed an independent analysis would a llow the le g is la tu re  
to examine a range o f  f is c a l  p o licy  options tha t previously had not 
been ava ilab le . The le g is la tu re  in i t ia t e d  the review process not as a 
means to c r i t i c i z e  the recommendations o f  the executive, but as a means 
to "present a l te rn a t iv e  recommendations when meaningful a lte rn a t ive s  are 
c le a r ly  a v a i l a b l e . T h e  ro le  of the f is c a l  analyst
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
q u ite  o ften could be an i r r i t a n t  to the governor.
The analysis o f Governor Judge’ s proposals by the analyst pro­
vided the le g is la tu re  w ith  a l te rn a t iv e  in te rp re ta t io n s  concerning the 
s ta te 's  ro le  in  property tax r e l i e f .  The analysis o f the governor's 
tax r e l i e f  plan began:
The executive budget purports to  contain $61.4 
m i l l io n  in  d ire c t  property tax r e l i e f  over the 
biennium. We believe there is no net property 
tax r e l i e f  in the budget. '9
The f is c a l  analyst argued tha t the governor's proposed s ta te  aid to
public  schools would be so low th a t property taxes which support local
schools would have to be raised by $30 m i l l io n  statewide. The f is c a l
analyst contended th a t  tha t f ig u re  would almost exactly  o f fs e t  the
$29.6 m i l l io n  the governor had included fo r  the reduction o f statewide
property taxes on owner-occupied homes. He recommended tha t the
le g is la tu re  increase sta te  pub lic  school support by $30 m i l l io n  above
what the governor had recommended, adding th a t only then would the
$29.6 m il l io n  Homestead R e lie f  Act tha t the governor supported and the
Montana voters had approved be real tax r e l i e f .  The f is c a l  analyst
said his own recommended leve l o f  s ta te  pub lic  school support would
allow to ta l school spending to increase about 7.25 percent annually,
while holding taxes on e x is t in g  real property constant. The governor
contended tha t his proposal would allow a 6 percent increase in to ta l
pub lic  school spending. The f is c a l  analyst maintained tha t the cost
increases assumed in  the executive ca lcu la t io n  would e n ta i l  increasing
the average voted school property tax levy 10 m il ls  by the end o f  the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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biennium, and tha t the governor’ s budget s ta f f  overestimated the
on
a v a i la b i l i t y  o f other revenue which could be used fo r  schools.
The d ire c to r  o f  the O ff ice  o f  Budget and Program Planning, who is  
in  charge o f preparing the governor’ s proposed budget, answered the 
f is c a l  analyst by contending the executive budget d id ,  in  fa c t ,  contain 
the $61.4 m i l l io n  in  d ire c t  property tax r e l i e f .  The d ire c to r  main­
tained tha t the f is c a l  ana lyst had mistakenly ca lcu la ted tha t school 
budgets would grow by 7.25 percent annually, since the analyst had not 
taken in to  account what the d ire c to r  said would be a decline in  e n ro l l ­
ment during the biennium. The d ire c to r  also ca lled  the f is c a l  a n a lys t 's  
7.25 percent f ig u re  " in f la t io n a r y , "  noting tha t Congress had projected ' 
an in f la t io n  ra te  o f  only 4.8 percent and the Consumer Price Index had 
been projected to r is e  only 5.5 percent in  1977.^1
As le g is la to rs  s i f te d  through the c o n f l ic t in g  analyses and conducted 
th e ir  own, the c h ie f  f is c a l  analyst o ffered more food fo r  thought when 
he contended tha t the Homestead R e lie f  proposal would a c tu a l ly  cost 
$34.5 m i l l io n  instead o f  the $29.6 m i l l io n  the governor had budgeted.
The executive ass is tan t to the governor a t t r ib u te d  the d iffe rences in  
the estimations o f the cost o f property tax r e l i e f  to  a d iffe rence  in 
underlying assumptions. The ch ie f  f is c a l  analyst a t t r ib u te d  the d i f ­
ferences in f igu res  to  the fa c t  tha t he had used a la rger number of 
owner-occupied residences in  his ca lcu la t io n s . He said the executive 
estimate used 23,000 fewer s in g le - fa m ily  residences in  th e ir  c a l ­
cu la t ions  fo r  1977 than had been reported in  the 1970 c e n s u s . T h e
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executive ass is tan t did not d i r e c t ly  challenge the a n a lys t 's  f ig u re s ,  
but said tha t i f  the le g is la tu re  funded the tax cut a t $29.6 m i l l io n  
and i f  there should be more eventual bene f ic ia r ie s  than the governor’ s 
data suggested, each homeowner would simply receive a smaller reduction 
in  his property tax b i l l .  The governor had repeatedly predicted through­
out the I n i t i a t i v e  72 campaign th a t the tax cuts would average about 
$100 to $110 per household.
Thus the le g is la tu re  had been presented w ith  d i f fe re n t  f igu res  by 
th e i r  own f is c a l  analyst and by the d ire c to r  o f  the governor's O ff ice  
o f Budget and Program Planning. As lawmakers formed th e i r  opinions 
concerning a lte rn a t iv e  uses o f  s ta te  funds, other areas o f  substantive 
opposition began to surface. One major problem o f the r e l i e f  plan 
recognized by proponents and c r i t ic iz e d  by opponents concerned the lack 
o f tax r e l i e f  provided by the measure fo r  renters or others who do not 
own the homes they occupy--a number estimated by opponents o f the 
measure as comprising one-th ird  of Montana's popu la t ion .^3 To address 
tha t sp e c if ic  c r i t ic is m  o f the plan, supporters promised tha t renters 
would not be overlooked in  the r e l ie f .  In a pamphlet provided by the 
Secretary o f S ta te 's  o f f ic e .  Voter Information fo r  Proposed C onstitu ­
t io n a l Amendments, Référendums, and I n i t i a t i v e s , which included voter 
information fo r  the November 2, 1976 e le c t io n ,  the C it izens fo r  Property 
Tax R e lie f  promised tha t renters would be aided. The rebu tta l to the 
argument advocating re je c t io n  o f  the measure s tated: " . . . l e g is la t io n
to provide r e l i e f  to  renters is  being prepared fo r  in troduc tion  in  the
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45th le g is la t iv e  assembly and would, i f  enacted, become e f fe c t iv e  a t 
the same time as I n i t i a t i v e  7 2 . However,  except fo r  the Property 
Tax Replacement Act, which the governor opposed and is  discussed below, 
no one introduced le g is la t io n  during the 45th le g is la t iv e  assembly to 
provide property tax r e l i e f  to ren te rs . Nevertheless, the press quoted 
the governor fo llow ing  the session as saying he had gotten everything
p c
he wanted in  the session; he made no mention o f renters .
The Property Tax Replacement Act constitu ted  an a l te rn a t iv e  plan 
designed to deal w ith  the property tax burden. This plan embodied an 
innovative and sweeping re v is ion  o f the s ta te 's  property tax system.
I f  enacted, i t  would have been the f i r s t  o f  i t s  kind o f  tax reform in  
the nation. The plan, designed to  e lim ina te  the d ire c t  property tax 
on owner-occupied homes in favor o f  a new tax on gross income, had been 
introduced four previous times in  the le g is la tu re .  The plan met w ith  
s t i f f  opposition from the governor. In the State o f  the State 
address, the governor said he "d id  not cons ide r.. .an  experimental gross 
income tax to be consistent w ith  equ ity  and fa irness in taxa tion .
This early  c r i t ic is m  o f the Property Tax Replacement Act served as an 
in d ica t io n  of the governor's s tra tegy fo r  the 45th session in dealing 
w ith  appropria tion items or items o f le g is la t io n  which were in  op­
p o s it ion  to his executive proposals.
Arguments concerning adm in is tra t ive  costs and contentions tha t the 
Homestead R e lie f  Act represented only a one-shot r e l i e f  plan also
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surfaced during the session. The la t t e r  ob jection  stemmed from the view
I?
tha t the plan re f lec te d  a piecemeal e f f o r t  a t reform, and th a t a one-
71shot g ra tu i ty  did not comprise an equitab le form o f  property tax r e l i e f .  
The contention th a t the plan provided no on-going r e l i e f  and tha t i t  
would become an impotent measure w ithout a large general-fund surplus 
engendered considerable le g is la t iv e  opposition to the Homestead R e lie f  
Act.
The argument tha t Montana badly needed a ra t io n a l ,  coherent system 
o f property tax reform prompted examination o f  a l te rn a t iv e  methods and 
the le g is la tu re  subjected the Homestead R e lie f  Act to  de ta iled  sc ru tiny . 
The governor labeled substantive opposition as a fa i lu r e  by the 
le g is la tu re  to respond to  the desires o f  the Montana people. The 
governor seemed bewildered by the gale o f  opposition blowing in  from 
a l l  points o f the p o l i t i c a l  compass against the r e l i e f  plan. The 
opposition ranged from f is c a l  conservatives who did not want to  spend 
the general-fund surplus to f is c a l  l ib e ra ls  who wanted to use the sur­
plus fo r  a l te rn a t iv e  expenditures. Another group believed th a t the 
concept o f c it ize n s  voting th e i r  own tax r e l i e f  could lend to chaos 
and insolvency in  government by circumventing the appropria tion  
process.29
To deal w ith  th is  unorganized array o f opposit ion , the governor 
resumed his h ig h -p ro f i le  s tra tegy and countered w ith  the strengths 
inherent in his executive ro le .  The governor, as is  his c o n s t i tu t io n a l
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prerogative (A r t ic le  6, Section 9 o f the Montana C o n s t i tu t io n ) ,
issued a mid-session budget message to the le g is la tu re .  In the message,
the governor brandished his veto power. He stated tha t he would not
to le ra te  any le g is la t iv e  t in ke r in g  w ith  his Homeowner's Property Tax
R e lie f  Act, nor would he allow a d e f i c i t  budget. The governor addressed
the le g is la tu re :
P o l i t ic s  is  the a r t  o f  compromise,. .however, 
th is  governor w i l l  not compromise the s ta te  
of Montana in to  a general-fund d e f i c i t ,  or 
repudiate the overwhelming mandate o f  the 
e lec to ra te  fo r  property tax r e l i e f , ^0
The governor cautioned the le g is la tu re  th a t he would veto any spending
measure tha t would reduce money a va ilab le  fo r  the property tax measure,
any attempt to repeal i t ,  and any increase o f more than 6,3 percent in
the sta te  foundation program fo r  support o f  pub lic  schools. Governor
Judge closed his mid-session budget message w ith  the warning:
I continue to maintain f u l l  confidence in  Montana's 
a b i l i t y  to provide adequate service levels fo r  
c i t iz e n s ,  to provide f u l l  funding o f the property 
tax r e l i e f  law enacted by the people, and to 
maintain a $12,5 m i l l io n  surplus as a cushion 
against unforeseen f lu c tu a t io n s  in  the economy.
I w i l l ,  as I have ind icated in the State o f  the 
State message and th is  le t t e r ,  r e s is t  w ith  the 
f u l l  c o n s t i tu t io n a l power o f th is  o f f ic e ,  le g is ­
la t iv e  actions which counteract attainment o f 
those g oa ls .31
As le g is la to rs  digested the executive 's message, the governor 
scheduled v is i t s  around the sta te  to discuss the Homestead R e lie f  Act 
and i t s  progress through the session. These v is i t s  prompted charges 
from some sectors th a t the t r ip s  constitu ted  p o l i t i c a l  junke ts . The
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governor repeatedly said throughout the s ta te : " . . . I  am amazed and
shocked tha t there are le g is la to rs  who are re lu c ta n t to support the 
measure a f te r  i t  was ca rr ied  by an absolute overwhelming margin by the 
people.
Therefore, as the session progressed, the governor again made i t  
c lear to the le g is la tu re  and Montana c it ize n s  th a t he expected the plan 
to be funded—and funded in ta c t .  The governor promised to use his con­
s t i tu t io n a l  prerogatives should his executive proposals be endangered 
by rev is ion  or a l te rn a t iv e  spending. And he continued to make i t  known 
to the le g is la tu re  tha t any attempt to  revise or deny funding would be 
in te rpre ted  as a b la ta n t disregard o f  the people's wishes. The governor, 
in e f fe c t ,  admonished le g is la to rs  tha t fa i lu r e  to fund the Homestead 
R e lie f Act would be tantamount to snubbing the democratic i n i t i a t i v e  
process, and tha t he, in his ro le  as executive, would be po in ting  out 
tha t fa c t to each and every Montana voter.
At one po in t during the session, the governor advised le g is la to rs  
tha t they should increase s ta te  income taxes i f  s ta te  revenues would 
not be s u f f ic ie n t  to fund his tax plan. The governor commented to  the 
press tha t i f  the money would not be ava ilab le  from any other source, 
he would support an income tax increase because he believed th a t  
Montanans would p re fer an income tax increase i f  they could re a l iz e  
some property tax r e l i e f .  Governor Judge made th is  comment a f te r  
being advised by a group o f le g is la to rs  tha t the large number o f 
revenue b i l l s  th a t had been f i l e d  during the session and the governor's
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own f is c a l  p ro jections fo r  the pub lic  school funding program jeopardized 
the funding o f the Homestead R e lie f  Act. Leg is la to rs  believed tha t the 
public  would tend to  view an income tax increase as the re s p o n s ib i l i ty  
o f the le g is la tu re ,  while property tax r e l i e f  would be cred ited  to the 
governor. Thus, the a lte rn a t ive s  a va ilab le  to le g is la to rs  appeared to 
be: (1) s a c r i f ic e  th e i r  own b i l l  preferences and fund the Homestead
R e lie f  Act; (2) fund th e i r  pet b i l l s  and the Homestead R e lie f  Act, 
thereby necessita ting more s ta te  revenue, probably in  the form o f in ­
creased income taxes; o r, (3) refuse to  fund the Homestead R e lie f  Act.
As the Homestead R e lie f  Act continued to draw f la k  fo r  substantive 
reasons, the a lte rn a t ive s  ava ilab le  to  le g is la to rs  created no shortage 
of p o l i t i c a l  skirmishes. As the deadline fo r  transm itta l of the b i l l  
from the House to  the Senate approached, both Republican and Democratic 
le g is la to rs  leveled charges a t the governor. Leg is la to rs  accused the 
governor o f  attempting to enter the le g is la t iv e  branch through the "back 
door" w ith  the Homestead R e lie f  Act and fo rc ing  the lawmakers in to  a 
p o l i t i c a l  corner on the issue.
As the tra n sm itta l deadline drew c lose r. House Democrats, who held 
a 57-43 m a jo r ity ,  continued to  be strong ly  s p l i t  over the Homestead 
R e lie f  Act. On A p r i l  6, a s t ra ig h t  p a r ty - l in e  vote in  the House forced 
a delay on the r e l i e f  plan vote. The in te n t  o f the delay was to give 
House Democrats time to work out th e i r  d iffe rences over the measure in  
the p r ivacy  o f the caucus. Opposition among Democrats ranged along the 
l ines  of c r i t ic is m s  discussed above. Yet the le g is la to rs  could not
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ignore the governor's pressure nor the fa c t  th a t the plan had been 
backed by over 200,000 Montanans. Republicans, on the other hand, 
argued th a t  the governor's proposal be considered as qu ick ly  as possible 
and, some said, k i l le d  i f  possible. Yet i t  seemed doubtful th a t House 
Republicans would hold the l in e  against funding the measure; a m a jo r ity  
o f th e i r  constituents had probably voted fo r  the measure, since the 
i n i t i a t i v e  carried  every county in  the s ta te . Some Republican 
le g is la to rs  weighed the thought o f embarrassing the Democratic governor 
by jo in in g  Democratic d iss iden ts .
Despite substantive opposition and f ru s t ra t io n  emanating from the 
governor's aggressive ta c t ic s ,  the Democratic m a jo r ity  in  the Montana 
House o f Representatives reversed i t s  pos it ion  on the Homestead R e lie f  
Act on A p r i l  8. With the Democrats muting th e i r  opposit ion , and w ith  
Republican help, the Homestead R e lie f  Act received funding fo r  a t le as t 
the f i r s t  year o f the 1977-79 biennium. The measure cleared the House 
on a vote o f 71-29.35 Democratic f lo o r  leaders secured support by 
exerting  pressure and proposing an amendment to  the funding measure.
The House amended the funding measure, HB 838, on the f lo o r  to  insure
that tax r e l i e f  fo r  a second year would not d ra in  the general-fund below
$6 m i l l io n .  The amendment also s t ip u la ted  th a t the plan not operate 
fo r  the 1978 tax year i f  the general-fund f a l l s  below $15 m i l l io n ,
The House sent both the Homestead R e lie f Act and the Property
Tax Replacement Act (HB 3) to the Senate fo r  d e l ib e ra t io n ,  but the re ­
placement plan met w ith  opposition in  the smaller body. During the
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Senate Taxation Committee' hearing on HB 3, proponents o f  the Property 
Tax Replacement Act leveled charges a t  the executive branch fo r  
v io la t io n s  of the separation o f  powers doctr ine  (A r t ic le  3, Section 1
07
of the Montana C o n s t itu t io n ).  The charges stemmed from the b e l ie f  
tha t the governor had sent in d iv id u a ls  from the executive branch to 
represent his opinions at the committee's hearing. Supporters o f  the 
tax replacement plan also contended th a t these representatives v io la ted  
another law because they had not reg is tered as lobby is ts  in accordance 
w ith  Section 43-803 o f the Revised Codes o f Montana, 1947.^^ The 
objections concerned the testimony o f  f iv e  members o f  the Montana De-
oq
partment o f Revenue at the A p r i l  7 hearing. Proponents o f the Property 
Tax Replacement Act contended tha t the governor had "badgered" them in  
order to defeat the tax replacement measure and secure funding fo r  the 
Homestead R e lie f  Act. The committee chairman's ru l in g  th a t  the committee 
had issued an in v i ta t io n  to  department spokesmen erased any question o f 
i l l e g a l i t y  concerning th e i r  testimony. Yet the author o f the Property 
Tax Replacement Act commented on record tha t he had never seen a b i l l  so 
lobbied by a governor.
Although nothing i l le g a l  did in  fa c t  occur, the opposition to HB 3 
by the Department o f Revenue consisted o f well organized presentations 
and comprehensive coverage. The department's incoming d ire c to r  
acknowledged tha t the testimony represented unique p a r t ic ip a t io n  by the 
department:
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I t  is  our normal custom to t e s t i f y  in  an informal 
manner and as su cc in c t ly  as poss ib le , fo r  the pur­
pose o f conserving your time. Because o f  the com­
p le x i t ie s  and fa r  reaching im p lica tions o f  th is  b i l l ,  
we are w ith  the Cha ir 's  indulgence, a l te r in g  our 
usual fo rm at.40
In any event, the Revenue Department's testimony did not cause HB 3 to be 
defeated in  the powerful Senate Taxation Committee. I t  passed by a 6-4 
vote. The measure had e a r l ie r  passed the House by an overwhelming 67-28 
b ip a rt isan  vote despite the governor's repeated warnings tha t he would 
veto the measure should i t  be approved. The Property Tax Replacement 
Act eventually went down to defeat in  the Senate by a vote o f 29-18.
The Montana Senate approved funding fo r  the Homestead R e lie f  Act
on A p r i l  18 by a vote o f 35-15. Immediately fo llow ing  the vote. Governor
Judge commented:
Great n e w s . . . i t  has been a long b a t t le - - fo u r  
years o f work on our pa rt.  I t ' s  a great 
v ic to ry  fo r  the more than 200,000 Montanans 
who voted fo r  i t .
Opponents f e l t  voters had been duped in to  voting fo r  i l lu s o r y  tax r e l i e f  
by a governor w ith  fu r th e r  p o l i t i c a l  ambitions. S im i la r ly ,  they f e l t  
th a t the governor acted in  a f i s c a l l y  ir respons ib le  manner because o f 
h is use of the i n i t i a t i v e  campaign. Some termed the plan a p o l i t i c a l  
gimmick to  assure Thomas Judge's re -e le c t io n  to Montana's highest 
o f f ic e  and contended tha t the overwhelming success o f I n i t i a t i v e  72 
stemmed from the nature and tim ing o f the " s e l l in g "  campaign waged by 
proponents. Opponents viewed the governor's use o f the i n i t i a t i v e  and 
pub lic  opinion as overstepping the boundaries between the executive 
and le g is la t iv e  branches o f  Montana sta te  government. They said the
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presence o f the i n i t i a t i v e  on the 1976 b a l lo t  declared, in e f fe c t :
"We have a $50 m i l l io n  surplus up here in  Helena, wouldn 't you l ik e  to 
have some o f i t? "  Opponents maintained th a t no voter would tu rn  down 
an e n t ic ing  deal l i k e  th a t ;  even renters would not turn i t  down, since 
they had been promised accompanying r e l i e f  le g is la t io n .
Those who supported the Homestead R e lie f  Act termed the v ic to ry  a 
success fo r  Montana and the beginning o f real property tax r e l i e f .  Sup­
porters perceived every attempt to  defeat the measure as a le g is la t iv e  
s la p - in - th e -fa ce  to the c i t iz e n s  who voted yes on I n i t i a t i v e  72. But 
some le g is la to rs  who voted fo r  the act f e l t  backed in to  a corner f i s c a l l y  
and p o l i  t i c a l l y .
In the end, however, the Homestead R e lie f  Act passed both houses 
o f the Montana le g is la tu re  by greater than a two to one margin.
I n i t i a t i v e  72, which had not c o n s t i tu t io n a l ly  required the 45th le g is la tu re  
to appropriate funds, had been in the le g is la t iv e  bag a f te r  a l l .  The 
e lec to ra te  o f Montana now had the tax r e l i e f  they voted fo r ,  and the 
governor had received everything he wanted in the 1977-79 biennium budget.
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CHAPTER I I  
CASE ANALYSIS
In troduction
The events leading to the funding o f the Homestead R e lie f  Act serve 
as an example o f  the complexities o f  the sta te  budgetary process. More­
over, areas o f controversy and concern remain w ith  regard to  the e ffe c ts  
th a t those events w i l l  have on fu tu re  s ta te  budgetary processes. The 
h is to ry  o f the Homestead R e lie f  Act assumes added importance when viewed 
as events which could reoccur. For th is  reason, i t  appears useful to 
examine those events.
I t  is  obvious th a t proposed le g is la t io n  l ive s  or dies upon the support 
tha t sponsors are able to muster. S im i la r ly ,  i t  is  apparent th a t the odds 
are weighted towards le g is la t io n  supported by those who are in  a p o s it ion  
to exert in fluence upon other p a r t ic ipa n ts  in  the process. Along these 
l in e s ,  the world o f budgeting has been described as a drama, populated by 
a wide and diverse v a r ie ty  o f actors soc ia lized in to  ro les and u t i l i z in g  
those roles as ca lcu la t in g  devices to s im p li fy  th e ir  budgetary dec is ion­
making processes.1 This view has been a r t ic u la te d  fu r th e r  in  tha t the 
ro les f i t  in w ith  one another and set up a pattern o f mutual expectations
p
among the p a r t ic ip a n ts .  This concept o f ro les and expectations in  the 
budgetary process is app licab le  in the case o f  the Homestead R e lie f  Act, 
as there were c o n f l ic t in g  in te rp re ta t io n s  o f what constitu ted  le g it im a te
24
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behavior. The fa c t  tha t  c i t i z e n  input became d i r e c t l y  involved through 
I n i t i a t i v e  72 prompted some members o f  the le g is la tu re  to perceive tha t  
an unexpected ro le  had been in c o r re c t ly  and unfortunate ly  in te r jec ted  
in to  the budgetary process. To these members o f  the 45th le g is la tu re ,  
the i n i t i a t i v e  represented pressure from outside the customary budgetary 
process.
The use of  the i n i t i a t i v e  involved a hybrid form of  democracy, 
composed of  representative democracy and d i re c t  democracy. There are 
obvious contrad ic t ions in the two. The Homestead R e l ie f  Act drew a t ten t ion  
to these inherent contrad ic t ions and how they affected the state  budgetary 
process. In the succeeding pages, the use o f  the hybrid democratic 
system is analyzed, along with  i t s  impl ica t ions fo r  the state budgetary 
process. The roles o f  the actors in the 1977-79 biennia l budgetary 
process, and the actors '  in te rp re ta t ions  of  those roles as affected by 
the hybrid democratic system, are also examined. C on s t i tu t io n a l ly  pre­
scribed roles are examined in the context o f  the p o l i t i c a l  pressures tha t  
emanated from the passage o f  I n i t i a t i v e  72.
The fo l lowing analysis addresses the impact which the hybrid form 
of democracy may have upon the state budgetary process in the fu tu re .  
S im i la r ly ,  an examination is  made o f  Governor Judge's employment o f  the 
hybrid system. When coupled with  his co ns t i tu t iona l  prerogatives as 
executive, th is  strategy provided the governor with vas t ly  increased 
leverage in his e f fo r t s  to secure acceptance of  his proposals. In 
tandem, these two var iables upset the f in e  balance between par t ic ipan ts  
in the budgetary process.
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Yet, even more fundamentally, the Homestead R e l ie f  Act raises l e g i t ­
imate doubts concerning the s u i t a b i l i t y  o f  d i r e c t  c i t i z e n  involvement 
in complex, technical decision-making in the state  budgetary process.
The a b i l i t y  of the e lectora te  to render sound decisions on anything but 
broadest po l icy  object ives is debatable. With the sta te  operation con­
t i n u a l l y  becoming more complex, the luxury o f  d i re c t  c i t i z e n  involvement 
in the s ta te 's  f i s c a l  decision-making is  suspect. The a b i l i t y  o f  a
governor to manipulate publ ic  opinion through the i n i t i a t i v e  process and
to apply increased pressure upon a le g is la tu re  is  demonstrated in the
case o f  the Homestead R e l ie f  Act. The i n i t i a t i v e  process w i l l  be
evaluated fo r  i t s  po ten t ia l  to d is rup t  the balance between executive and 
le g is la t i v e  power in the budgetary process, and fo r  the s u i t a b i l i t y  o f  
d i r e c t  c i t i z e n  involvement in complex, spe c i f ic  budgetary decis ion­
making.
The Off ice  of  the Governor
The o f f i c e  o f  governor provides the occupant important too ls with 
which to funct ion w i th in  the state organizat ion. Those tools  are the 
legal and cons t i tu t io na l  powers o f  the o f f i c e .  However, the governor 
might very well become a faceless p a r t ic ip a n t  in  the process, only 
performing dut ies programmed by s ta tu te ,  unless the governor's personal 
impact upon the state organizat ion is f e l t .  Therefore, a governor is  
personally  challenged, in a sense, to e f fe c t  changes;
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The state organizat ion,  l i k e  most large organizat ions, 
is  p e r fec t ly  capable o f  running i t s e l f .  Off ices 
and re s p o n s ib i l i t i e s  are delineated by s ta tu te ,  while 
day-to-day operations are activated by a programmed 
flow o f  work which ra re ly  requires in te rven t ion  by 
executive act ion.  This s i tua t io n  presents a serious 
problem fo r  a governor, f o r  i t  forces him to seek 
changes in  the organization as a means o f  becoming 
re levant to i t .  Unless he does change the organi­
zation in some way, there w i l l  be nothing fo r  which 
the governor can "take c re d i t "  and nothing to show 
tha t  his tenure in o f f i c e  had any impact on the organi­
zat ion. The governor is  thus a focal po in t  fo r  change, 
not so much because he is  personally  in terested in 
reform (though he may be), but because implementation 
of  some change is  the only way th a t  he can demonstrate 
his presence as governor.3
Along these l in e s ,  any governor's impact w i l l  be in d ica t ive  of  and
dependent upon personal s ty le  and personal asp ira t ions.  The impact the
ch ie f  executive has upon the sta te  organization w i l l  be evident in the
changes ef fected. The governor must personally  devise the means through
which those changes are enacted, since state government generally  is  not
designed to aid such changes;
There are no rules which t e l l  the governor what to 
do to promote change, nor are there any bureaucratic 
un i ts  established to search out po tent ia l  areas of 
change. I f  change is to  come, therefore,  i t  must come 
as a product o f  the governor's own resources. The 
o f f i c e  o f  governor is  thus cast in an in tensely  per­
sonal l i g h t ,  in which gubernatorial ro le performance 
seems to be r e la t i v e l y  more dependent upon the per­
sona l i ty  t r a i t s  o f  incumbents than upon s i tua t iona l  
or organizat ion c h a ra c te r is t ic s .4
Therefore, how much inf luence a governor ac tua l ly  exerts over the 
state budgetary process i s ,  to  a large extent,  dependent upon the i n d i ­
vidual execut ive 's  desire to exert  ^ny in f luence. I f  such attempts to
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exert  in f luence are not made, i t  i s  not because a governor cannot; i t  
is because the governor w i l l  not. I t  is  a matter o f  the in d iv id u a l 's  
own perceptions and motivat ions, p a r t i c u la r l y  with regard to views o f  
p o l i t i c a l  customs, t r a d i t i o n s ,  and opportun i t ies .  For th is  reason, the 
o f f i c e  o f  governor appears to be thoroughly colored by the personal s ty le  
o f  each occupant. While every governor obviously is  subjected to legal 
and admin is tra t ive  r e s t ra in ts ,  the most immediate l im i t s  on gubernator­
ia l  act ion are essen t ia l ly  p o l i t i c a l .  Whether these l im i t s  are accepted 
or challenged, and how a challenge is  made, u l t im a te ly  depend on what 
the governor wants and what is  done to get i t .
For Thomas Judge, a record o f  sound management ev ident ly  did not 
provide an adequate example o f  his " impact" on Montana state government. 
Lacking a s ing le ,  h ig h ly - v is ib le  change which could represent any ac­
complishment fo r  which he might take c r e d i t ,  the governor sought to 
ca p i ta l i z e  upon the general-fund surplus. Thus, the governor, conceivably 
motivated to make a personal impact upon state government in the eyes of 
the Montana e lec to ra te ,  chose to take an act ive  decision-making ro le  in 
the formulation o f  Montana's 1977-79 biennia l budget.
However, as Norton Long w r i te s ,  "s ing le  headedness in the executive 
gives no assurances o f  singleness of  purpose."^ There could be no 
guarantee that the 45th le g is la tu re  would en te r ta in  the same singleness 
o f  purpose concerning the general-fund surplus. Therefore, as a means 
o f  maximizing chances fo r  success, the Governor chose to in t e r j e c t  the 
Montana e lectora te  as a d i r e c t  p a r t ic ip a n t  in to  the budgetary process.
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In the form o f  I n i t i a t i v e  72, the "s ing le  headedness" of  Thomas 
Judge assumed p o l i t i c a l  s ign i f icance .  The governor attached his campaign 
to property tax r e l i e f ,  and the addi t ion o f  the Homestead Re l ie f  Act to 
the governor's re -e lec t ion  campaign placed him in a p a r t i c u la r l y  ad­
vantageous p o l i t i c a l  s i tu a t io n .
The Public Budgetary Process
The Montana e lec to ra te  had a d i re c t  impact upon the state budgetary 
process through I n i t i a t i v e  72. Budgeting is  a p o l i t i c a l  process in which
decisions are id e a l ly  made through comparisons of  a l te rn a t ive  uses of
public  monies. There is  no absolute standard o f  value in the budgetary 
process. Ide a l ly ,  the resu l ts  o f  an expenditure must be worth th e i r  
cost,  and the resu l ts  must be more valuable than the outcome would be i f  
the money is used fo r  any other purpose. Since there are too few re ­
sources to meet a l l  o f  the competing desires o f  the pub l ic ,  budgetary 
decisions should attempt to secure a benef ic ia l  compromise acceptable to 
a major i ty  o f  the pub l ic .  Comparing re la t i v e  values is i n t r i n s i c  to the 
s ta te  f i s c a l  process:
Budget decisions must be made on the basis o f  r e la ­
t ive  values. Comparison of  re la t i v e  values to  be
obtained from a l te rn a t iv e  uses of  funds is  neces­
sary because resources are inadequate to dp the 
things considered necessary and des irab le .°
When publ ic  budgets are viewed as planning devices used to t rans la te  
present scarce f i s c a l  resources in the public  sector in to  fu tu re  govern­
mental goals and programs, they become v i t a l  instruments fo r  d i rec t ing  
the tasks government w i l l  perform and the ways in which public monies 
w i l l  be used. As V. 0. Key points out:
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The $64,00 question on the expenditure side o f  
publ ic  budgeting is :  On what basis shall  i t  be
decided to a l loca te  X do l la rs  to A c t i v i t y  A i n ­
stead o f  a l loca t ing  them to A c t i v i t y  B, or i n ­
stead of  al lowing the taxpayer to use the money 
fo r  his ind iv idua l  purposes.?
The budget process is  thus a key element in state decision-making, and
when viewed as a p o l i t i c a l  document the budget r e f l e c t s ,  through the
a l lo ca t io n  o f  funds, the in te res ts  o f  the body p o l i t i c  as expressed by
le g is la t i v e  bodies,^ Aaron Wildavsky refers to the process as:
. . . a  seamless web of  choices concerned not merely 
with  f i s c a l  aspects o f  a l lo ca t in g  public  monies, 
but w i th  the e n t i re  fa b r ic  of  democratic s o c i e t y . ^
Throughout the budgetary process the legal and co ns t i tu t iona l  roles of  
the pa r t ic ipan ts  must in te ra c t .  I t  is  tha t  in te rac t ion  between par t ic ipan ts  
which const i tu tes  the system in  which a l lo c a t iv e  decisions are made. How­
ever,  the decisions concerning the state  f i s c a l  process are never made 
in a vacuum. They are made with  an ear attuned to the desires o f  con­
s t i tu e n ts .
Although the re s p o n s ib i l i t y  fo r  f i n a l  decisions on f i s c a l  po l icy  is 
assumed by elected representat ives,  tha t  cons t i tu t iona l  duty is  merely 
but one fac to r  in the appropr ia t ion process. The decision-making process 
is  comprised o f  much more than the c o n s t i t u t io n a l l y  prescribed roles of  
the p a r t ic ipa n ts .  Because many external factors a f fe c t  tha t  process, 
those ro les are shaped by the expectations tha t  come to be held by the 
p a r t ic ip a n ts .  In other words, while  the c o ns t i tu t ion  and statutes o f  the 
s ta te  e x p l i c i t l y  describe the leg i t im a te  roles o f  the pa r t ic ipan ts  in 
the s ta te 's  f i s c a l  decision-making process, external factors pose
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constra in ts  and o f fe r  opportun i t ies  to  the par t ic ipan ts  which cannot be 
traced to the con s t i tu t ion  or codes o f  law.
I f  i t  is assumed that  p o l i t i c a l  act ion is  ra t io n a l ,  with  both p o l i t i ­
cians and voters act ing in  t h e i r  s e l f - i n te r e s t s ,  then a p o l i t i c i a n ' s  ob­
je c t i v e  is  to stay in  power, while voters '  object ives are to maximize 
the net benefi ts which they derive from the f i s c a l  operation ( i . e . ,  the 
excess o f  benef its  derived from governmental expenditures over tax costs) .  
Voters w i l l  thus cast t h e i r  votes fo r  those who w i l l  best represent th e i r  
in te res ts .  P o l i t i c ia n s  w i l l  o f fe r  programs and support le g is la t io n  which 
best meet the desires o f  t h e i r  const i tuents.  Those elected o f f i c i a l s  
who come c losest to meeting those desires w i l l  receive the most votes, 
and hence gain or re ta in  p o l i t i c a l  power.
The above is a genera l izat ion o f  the motivations o f  p o l i t i c a l  ac t ion ,  
and does not mean tha t  pa r t ic ipan ts  in the budgetary process operate only 
on a vote-maximization ra t iona le .  Yet, i t  is  argued tha t  par t ic ipan ts  
w i l l  not usually  pursue goals contrary to what they perceive are the 
desires o f  c o n s t i tu te n ts .
I n i t i a t i v e  72 const i tu ted  the entrance o f  the c i t i z e n ry  d i r e c t l y  in to
the budgetary process. Whether tha t  entry had an in ju r iou s  e f fec t  on the
budgetary process must be resolved. S p e c i f i c a l ly ,  did the placing o f  
the measure on the statewide b a l lo t  adequately al low comparison o f  r e la ­
t i v e  values, or examination o f  a l te rn a t iv e  use of  funds? Did the le g is ­
la tu re  adequately examine a l te rn a t ive  uses o f  the funds? Did the
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i n i t i a t i v e  process diminish the le g is la tu re 's  d isc re t ion  in a l loca t ing  
s tate funds? While the governor and other proponents o f  I n i t i a t i v e  72 
acknowledged tha t  the Homestead R e l ie f  Act could become operational only 
w i th  the funding of  the le g is la tu re ,  they did not counsel the Montana 
e lec to ra te  to compare adequately a l l  o f  the a l te rn a t ive  uses to which 
the funds might be put.
P o l i t i c a l  Pressures to Fund the Homestead Re l ie f  Act
Cr i t ic isms o f  the Homestead R e l ie f  Act are re levant to th is  analysis 
in  tha t  they provide evidence tha t  the le g is la tu re  made comparisons o f  
a l te rna t ives  and studied the r e la t i v e  value o f  proposals. Furthermore, 
the substantive c r i t ic ism s  and defenses o f  the governor's proposals pro­
vide evidence tha t  the budgetary process kindled controversy over how 
the s ta te 's  l im i ted  resources should be a l located.
Nevertheless, the November vote could not be overlooked. Only those 
who believe tha t  budgeting is  purely an economic endeavor can minimize 
the e f fec ts  tha t  I n i t i a t i v e  72 had on the le g is la t i v e  budgetary process. 
Those who know tha t  budgeting is  esse n t ia l ly  a p o l i t i c a l  process recognize 
tha t  p o l i t i c a l  pressures stemming from the i n i t i a t i v e  had decided e f fec ts  
upon the p o l i t i c a l  f e a s i b i l i t y  o f  a l te rna t ives  ava i lab le  to le g is la to rs  
concerning the funding of  the Homestead Re l ie f  Act.
What can be argued {and le g is la to rs  made th is  argument) is  tha t  
through the inc lus ion  o f  an external p a r t ic ip a n t ,  the governor sought to 
circumvent the established f i s c a l  process. In other words, the governor
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"stacked the deck" In his favor by creat ing a scenario in  which the 
executive and le g is la t i v e  roles assumed new meaning. I n i t i a t i v e  72 serves 
as an example of  a governor's fundamental advantage in using the i n i t i a ­
t i v e  process to secure support fo r  executive proposals. That advantage 
is  inherent in  the governor's ro le  in  the sta te  organization. Any 
governor who chooses to  attempt to garner support through an i n i t i a t i v e  
campaign possesses a l l  o f  the powers o f  public  a c c e s s ib i l i t y  ava i lab le  to 
a ch ie f  executive. This a b i l i t y  to maintain high v i s i b i l i t y  with  the publ ic  
a f fords a governor the opportunity to " s e l l "  an idea to the e lectorate 
by using those o f f i c i a l  l ines o f  communication. The leg is la tu re  has no 
comparable means w i th in  the state organizat ion to r a l l y  public  opinion.
When employed by a governor to gain acceptance of  executive pro­
posals, the i n i t i a t i v e  process t i l t s  the balance between executive and 
le g is la t i v e  power towards the executive. Through the i n i t i a t i v e  process 
a governor can, in e f f e c t ,  sidestep the le g is la tu re  by f i r s t  s e l l in g  a 
proposal to the e lec to ra te .  Legally  the ro le  o f  the le g is la tu re  is  not 
sh i f te d .  Nevertheless, a de facto ro le  s h i f t  does occur when the 
e lectora te  becomes d i r e c t l y  involved in po l icy  formulat ion. The p o l i t i c a l  
pressures upon a le g is la tu re  to  comply w i th  the e lec to ra te 's  message 
embodied in an i n i t i a t i v e  are a compell ing force.
When s k i l l f u l l y  employed by a governor, the i n i t i a t i v e  process can 
upset the expected f i s c a l  policy-making ro le  o f  the le g is la tu re  as 
e f f e c t i v e ly  as i f  a de ju re  ro le  s h i f t  had occurred. Governor Judge 
created a protagonis t-antagonis t  re la t ionsh ip  between h imself ,  the
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l e g is la tu re ,  and the Montana e lec to ra te .  That i s ,  he assumed the ro le  
o f  the people's a l l y  against the regressive incidence and s t i f l i n g  
burden o f  the property tax ,  while  the le g is la tu re  was forced to assume 
the ro le  o f  an obstacle between the Montana people and property tax 
r e l i e f .  The governor cast himself  in  the ro le  o f  defender of  property 
tax r e l i e f ,  and cast the le g is la tu re  in  the ro le  o f  a th reat  to  that  
r e l i e f .  He had not in any way techn ica l ly  affected the le g is la tu re 's  
co n s t i tu t iona l  ro le  o f  budgetary decision-makers, but he had d r a s t i c a l l y  
affected any budgetary decisions tha t  might endanger the Homestead Re l ie f  
Act. By creat ing the s i tu a t io n  in which the Homestead Re l ie f  Act repre­
sented the in v io la b le  w i l l  o f  the Montana people, the governor had made 
the issue more than a plan to provide property tax r e l i e f .  I t  became a 
question of  the le g is la tu re 's  responsiveness to the desires of the Montana 
people as expressed in the passage of  I n i t i a t i v e  72. The governor demon­
strated tha t  executive au tho r i ty  is  inherent ly  more receptive to d i r e c t  
c i t i z e n  p a r t ic ip a t io n  than is  the le g is la t i v e  branch. An i n i t i a t i v e  
p o te n t ia l l y  c r ipp les a le g is la t i v e  body in i t s  ro le  as a l loca to r  o f  
pub l ic  monies.
Governor Judge’ s determined and continuous appeals to the Montana 
e lectorate  to remind le g is la to rs  tha t  they expected " t h e i r "  Homestead 
R e l ie f  Act to be funded, and his many threats to veto any item which posed 
a th rea t  to his executive proposals, came across to some le g is la to rs  as 
an executive attempt to overstep the boundary between executive and 
le g is la t i v e  branch. A le g is la to r  who chooses to vote contrary to a piece 
o f  c i t i z e n - i n i t i a t e d  le g is la t io n  is forced to  defend tha t  choice against
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charges of  unresponsive representation. Any vote which is  a t  odds with  
the desire o f  an e lec to ra te  as expressed through an i n i t i a t i v e  requires 
an unusually comprehensive and d i f f i c u l t  j u s t i f i c a t i o n .  Even with such 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n ,  the repurcussions are l i k e l y  to be decidedly negative fo r  
a dissent ing l e g is la to r .  A le g is la to r  who ignores those pressures and 
chooses to oppose a piece of  c i t i z e n - i n i t i a t e d  le g is la t io n  that is  backed 
by a governor faces opposit ion from const i tuents ,  from opponents in the 
next e lec t ion ,  from the governor's o f f i c e ,  and possibly from the news 
media.
The th rea t  o f  adverse reactions is  often j u s t  as potent a force as 
the actual repurcussions. Although i t  is  d i f f i c u l t  to assess precisely 
what repurcussions a negative vote on the Homestead Re l ie f  Act 's  funding 
caused, i t  is  apparent tha t  many le g is la to rs  preceived themselves as 
pressured to vote f o r  the Homestead R e l ie f  Act by the " th rea t"  o f  adverse 
consequences. Since the measure passed ra ther  handily,  any negative 
repurcussions fo r  those who voted against the measure qu i te  l i k e l y  have 
not been as severe as they might have been had the measure been defeated. 
In the case o f  the Homestead R e l ie f  Act , a s u f f i c i e n t  "bark" precluded 
the need fo r  a " b i t e " .
To attempt to ca lcu la te  the number of  leg is la to rs  fundamentally 
opposed to the i n i t i a t i v e ,  or those who simply chose not to r i s k  th e i r  
own p o l i t i c a l  fu tures by refus ing to fund the Homestead Re l ie f  Act, would 
be a d i f f i c u l t  undertaking. This is  not meant as an imp l ica t ion  tha t  
the measure received funding so le ly  due to the pressures of  I n i t i a t i v e  72,
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f o r  some le g is la to rs  approved o f  the plan and favored i t s  funding. How­
ever, many lawmakers opposed the Homestead Re l ie f  Act both substantively  
and p o l i t i c a l l y ,  and favored a l te rn a t iv e  appropr ia t ions.  For many of  
those le g is la to rs ,  the i n i t i a t i v e  process created the pressures which 
u l t im a te ly  led to the funding o f  the measure.
In th is  regard, i t  is  in te res t ing  to speculate whether the Property 
Tax Replacement Act might have passed had i t  not been fo r  the confron­
ta t io n  w i th  the governor and his budget and I n i t i a t i v e  72. The same holds 
t rue f o r  other items o f  le g is la t io n  and appropriat ion during the session. 
Items which posed threats to the funding of  the governor's r e l i e f  plan 
occupied a pos i t ion  of  double jeopardy, in tha t  they faced gubernatorial 
opposit ion and they could be in terpreted as v io la t in g  the w i l l  o f  the 
e lec to ra te .  The governor, in two previous sessions, had fa i le d  to se l l  
s im i la r  property tax le g is la t io n  to le g is la to rs .  Considering those two 
previous defeats,the amount o f  substantive opposit ion to the Homestead 
Re l ie f  Act voiced by le g is la to rs  throughout the session, and the number 
of  dollar-consuming "pet"  b i l l s  introduced by le g is la to rs ,  i t  is  l i k e l y  
that  without I n i t i a t i v e  72 the le g is la t i v e  budgetary process would have 
produced d i f f e re n t  fates f o r  the Property Tax Replacement Act and other 
items o f  appropr ia t ion and le g is la t io n
Impl ications fo r  Public Budgeting
The precedent set by Governor Judge's successful employment o f  the 
i n i t i a t i v e  process has increased the l ike l ihood  tha t  fu tu re  state budgetary
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
37
decisions w i l l  be s im i la r l y  affected by d i r e c t  voter involvement through 
i n i t i a t i v e s .  In addressing the impl icat ions o f  the use o f  the i n i t i a t i v e  
process in  state f i s c a l  po l icy  making, i t  is useful to approach the 
matter in  two ways: (1) the merits of  the i n i t i a t i v e  process as a means
to a f fe c t  s tate f i s c a l  p o l ic y ;  and (2) the impact the i n i t i a t i v e  process 
is l i k e l y  to have on fu tu re  state f i s c a l  processes.
Because the b iennia l budget i s ,  in  e f fe c t ,  the "b luepr in t "  by which 
the s ta te  operates fo r  two years, the means through which tha t  budget is 
formed are v i t a l l y  important. The use o f  the i n i t i a t i v e  process to a f fe c t  
state f i s c a l  decisions poses p o te n t ia l l y  detrimental consequences. The 
perplexing issue is whether or not the e lectora te  has the expert ise or 
the information w ith  which to make complex choices between a l te rn a t ive  uses 
o f  s ta te  funds. As the s ta te 's  f i s c a l  process becomes evermore complex, 
with the Montana 1977-79 biennia l  budget at  nearly $1 b i l l i o n ,  can the 
state continue to honor the i n i t i a t i v e  process when that  process repre­
sents po tent ia l  f i s c a l  insolvency? Is there any feas ib le  way to provide 
an e lectora te  w i th  the information needed to judge adequately the meri ts 
o f  a l te rn a t ive  uses o f  funds? The Homestead Re l ie f  Act provides an ex­
ample o f  the i n i t i a t i v e  process creat ing p o l i t i c a l  pressures which d i r e c t l y  
affected the le g is la tu re 's  contro l o f  s ta te  funds. Upon what c r i t e r i a  
did the e lectora te  make th e i r  decision? Is the value o f  the i n i t i a t i v e  
process s u f f i c i e n t  to o f f s e t  the po ten t ia l  costs?
I t  probably is  not feas ib le  to use d i r e c t  democratic f i s c a l  processes 
in anything but the smallest forum. The q u a l i t i e s  o f  "pure" democracy
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
38
have not diminished since Thomas Jefferson called the town meeting "the
wisest invention ever devised by the w i t  o f  man fo r  the perfect  exercise
of self-government and fo r  i t s  p r e s e r v a t i o n . H o w e v e r ,  the social
basis fo r  the d i r e c t  form of democracy known as the town meeting has
disappeared even from the local scene--the small,  autonomous, homogeneous,
and somewhat iso la ted community. The ro le  o f  pure democracy is perhaps
overestimated in contemporary soc iety .  As John Dewey sa id, " i t  is a form
o f  id o la t r y  to erect means in to  the ends which they serve. Democratic
p o l i t i c a l  forms are simply the best means tha t  human w i t  has devised up
11to a special time in  h is to ry . "  Perhaps up to Jef ferson 's  "time in 
h is to ry "  the town meeting ( i . e . ,  d i r e c t  democracy) was the best means fo r  
the pract ice  and maintenance o f  self-government. Today at leas t ,  the best 
means is  no longer d i re c t  democracy but the representative system.
The old powers o f  town meetings have passed to e lec t ive  and appointive 
o f f i c i a l s .  Representative democracy has displaced the "pure" democracy 
o f  the town meeting as the best means o f  self-government (the c r i t e r i a  fo r  
judging "best" in th is  context are governmental e f f ic ie n cy  and e f fe c t i v e ­
ness w i th in  a system based upon d i r e c t  accoun tab i l i ty  and a c c e s s ib i l i t y - -  
the "pure" democratic system's su p e r io r i ty  in accoun tab i l i ty  and accessi­
b i l i t y  has been overcome by the system's inherent in e f f i c ie n c ie s  in 
dealing w i th  the complexi t ies o f  contemporary government operations).
Today only the broadest po l icy  contro l is  exercised by the voting c i t i z e n .  
The fa c t  tha t  the town meeting's d i r e c t  form of democracy is rap id ly  be­
coming obsolete does not mean democracy is  outmoded. Representative
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governments on every level must face the same major problem: how can
governments secure expert handling of  techn ica l ,  complex a f f a i r s ,  and yet 
leave contro l o f  po l icy  in  the hands o f  an e lectora te  tha t  has neither 
the t ra in ing  nor the time to  comprehend these a f f a i r s  in de ta i l?
The complexi t ies o f  contemporary sta te  government preclude the e n t i re
e lec to ra te 's  dealing w i th  re levant f i s c a l  information upon which to base
budgetary decis ions:
In a democratic soc ie ty ,  the d iv is io n  of  resources 
between the public  and p r iva te  sectors is roughly 
determined by the e lec to ra te ,  but because i t  is  such 
a complex and time consuming task, the e lectora te  is 
ch ron ica l ly  ignorant o f  the costs and b en e f i ts ,o f  
many actual and potent ia l  government po l ic ies .
C o l le c t iv e ly ,  the e lec to ra te  is usually incapable o f  adequately weighing 
sp e c i f ic  po l icy  a l t e rn a t i v e s . Decisions requ ir ing  deta i led examination 
of  r e la t i v e  values of  complex and technical uses o f  funds severely s t ra in  
an e le c to ra te ’ s ca p a b i l i t y  to render sound choices. Incapacity to weigh 
adequately spec i f ic  po l icy  a l te rna t ives  does not preclude the e lec to ra te 's  
a b i l i t y  to address broad po l icy  issues r a t i o n a l l y ,  nor the a b i l i t y  to 
evaluate r a t io n a l l y  the actions of  elected representatives in pursu i t  of 
those broad p o l ic ie s .  In other words, an e lectora te  can r a t io n a l l y  de­
termine ends, but must delegate au tho r i ty  to devise the sp e c i f ic ,  complex 
and technical means to reach those ends. An e lec to ra te ,  in th is  sense, 
while being unable c o l le c t i v e ly  to c r i t i q u e  spec i f ic  means, is capable 
o f  assessing outcomes o f  spe c i f ic  p o l ic ie s .
Elected representatives weigh the r e la t i v e  values o f  spec i f ic  po l icy  
a l te rna t ives  designed to achieve the broad po l icy  object ives voiced
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c o l le c t i v e ly  by the e lec to ra te .  Therefore, w i th in  the representative 
system an e lectora te  can r a t i o n a l l y  determine i f  representatives are 
serving t h e i r  in te re s ts ,  while not being capable o f  determining the 
meri ts o f  sp e c i f ic  means to those ends. S im i la r ly ,  elected representa­
t ives  can assess the broad desires of an e lec to ra te ,  and thus make 
sp ec i f ic  choices among complex a l te rna t ives  designed to achieve those 
po l icy  ob ject ives.
I t  is  f u t i l e  to attempt to assess the value o f  the I n i t i a t i v e  process, 
since tha t  process is  an invaluable commodity in a democracy. Yet to 
ensure an e lec to ra te 's  a b i l i t y  to cope w i th  s p e c i f i c ,  complex issues, 
means must be devised by which each voter is  provided easy access to 
re levant in formation. The Montana e lectora te  did not have adequate i n ­
formation to judge the meri ts o f  the Homestead Re l ie f  Act or to weigh 
adequately a l te rna t ives  to the measure. Although i t  is not beyond the 
realm of  p o s s ib i l i t y  to devise a d i re c t  democratic f i s c a l  process on the 
s ta te  level in which the e lec to ra te  is  exposed to and br iefed on data 
per t inen t  to the state budget, i t  must be viewed as a mammoth undertaking. 
The avalanche o f  data per t inent  to the budgetary process taxes the 
capacity o f  even the le g is la tu re  to make s u f f i c ie n t  examinations o f  the 
mater ia l upon which to  make f i s c a l  decisions. Although taxed by time 
and the nature o f  the task,  the le g is la tu re  has access to state f i s c a l  
in formation which the average Montanan does not read i ly  have at his 
d isposal.  The p rac t ica l  l im i ta t io n s  upon a system dedicated to exposing 
each voter to f i s c a l  data in  a manner comparable to the exposure
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l e g is la to rs  receive are obvious. These p rac t ica l  l im i ta t io n s  are the 
key hindrances on the e lec to ra te 's  a b i l i t y  to produce sa t is fac to ry  
f i s c a l  decis ions.
The existence o f  these l im i t i n g  factors serves to accent the ro le  
of  the le g is la tu re  in  the s ta te  f i s c a l  process, and must cause careful 
examinations of those instances in  which the public becomes d i r e c t l y  in -  . 
volved. Although the le g is la tu re  is  subject to the same constra ints 
in  the f i s c a l  process, those constra in ts  are e f fe c t i v e ly  diminished 
through the le g is la tu re 's  r e la t i v e l y  small s ize,  access to pert inent 
data and a b i l i t y  to debate issues as a un i f ied  body. To diminish the 
constra in ts  upon the e lec to ra te ,  extensive modif icat ions must be made.
A fundamental necessity is  an increase in  voter in te re s t  and awareness 
at the grassroots leve l .  Public forums in each l o c a l i t y  across the sta te 
could provide a vehic le  through which re levant information could be 
relayed to state voters. Along these same l ines ,  more extensive use of 
news media d irected towards pub l ic  awareness o f  f i s c a l  po l icy  issues 
could s im i la r l y  increase an e lec to ra te 's  a b i l i t y  to  render knowledgeable 
decisions. State f inanced media information concerning po l icy  issues 
embodied in i n i t i a t i v e s  could serve to  create more balanced i n i t i a t i v e  
campaigns and insure a more balanced presentation o f  pro and con arguments. 
I t  also can be argued tha t  i t  is  the ro le  of  the opposit ion ( inc lud ing 
le g is la t i v e  candidates) to inform the e lec to ra te  o f  the "be t te r "  choices 
a t  the time o f  the i n i t i a t i v e  campaign. I t  must be recognized tha t  w i th ­
out serious a t ten t ion  d irected towards devising p rac t ica l  means to ensure
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the e le c to ra te 's  a b i l i t y  to weigh adequately a l l  o f  the variables i n ­
volved in  the f i s c a l  process, the continuance o f  d i re c t  c i t ize n  invo lve­
ment can only re s u l t  in  c o l le c t i v e  decisions made through varying 
degrees o f  ignorance.
In the case o f  I n i t i a t i v e  72, Governor Judge presented to the 
Montana e lec to ra te  a s k i l l f u l l y  marketed "package". Any voice o f  opposi­
t ion  able to  ta rn ish  tha t  package required s im i la r l y  s k i l l f u l  orches­
t r a t io n .  The i n i t i a t i v e  did not appear to represent imminent f inanc ia l  
danger to the s ta te .  To the contrary.  I n i t i a t i v e  72 as presented to the 
e lec to ra te  was an a t t r a c t i v e  propos i t ion .  Cer ta in ly  the wording o f  the 
proposal on the b a l lo t  contr ibuted to the success of  the Homestead Re l ie f  
Act,  fo r  undoubtedly few taxpayers would choose to vote "against reduction 
o f  owner's property tax l i a b i l i t y  on owner-occupied res iden t ia l  property". 
Without any systematic method o f  supplying the e lectorate  with the i n ­
formation upon which to judge the merits o f  the Homestead Re l ie f  Act 
r e la t i v e  to a l te rn a t iv e  uses o f  s ta te  funds, the opposit ion to I n i t i a t i v e  
72 remained s t r i c t l y  spontaneous and unorganized.
In con tras t ,  the Budgetary Procedures Cei l ing Act o f  1976, an i n i ­
t i a t i v e  proposal on the same b a l lo t  as I n i t i a t i v e  72, experience a con­
s iderably  greater amount of  opposit ion.  The Budgetary Procedures Cei l ing 
Act sought to put a c e i l i n g  of  $375 m i l l i o n  on Montana le g is la t i v e  appro­
p r ia t ions  fo r  any one biennium, along with  a gradual h a l t  to the s ta te 's  
use o f  federal f u n d s , I f  tha t  i n i t i a t i v e  proposal had passed, and the 
c e i l i n g  had been in terpre ted to apply to a l l  o f  the funds appropriated
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by the le g is la tu re ,  the resu l ts  could have been chaot ic . While i t  can 
be argued tha t  th is  i n i t i a t i v e ' s  f a i l u r e  demonstrates the e lec to ra te 's  
basic awareness and r e s p o n s ib i l i t y ,  i t  can s im i la r l y  be argued tha t  the 
e lectora te  simply responded to the great amount o f  opposit ion which 
emanated from across the p o l i t i c a l  spectrum. The d i f fe rence in amount 
o f  opposit ion voiced against I n i t i a t i v e  72 and the Budgetary Procedures 
Cei l ing Act obviously can be a t t r ib u te d  to the nature of  the two i n i t i a ­
t i v e  proposals. Yet, i t  is  s im i la r l y  va l id  to a t t r i b u te  the lack of  
organized opposi t ion to I n i t i a t i v e  72 to the fa c t  tha t  such opposit ion 
seemed to represent opposit ion to the idea o f  property tax r e l i e f .  As 
discussed prev ious ly ,  while many le g is la to rs  shared the Montana e le c to r ­
a te 's  desire f o r  property tax r e l i e f ,  many le g is la to rs  opposed the 
Homestead Re l ie f  Act as a means to reach those ends. Yet, many avoided 
taking a f i rm  stand because such a pos i t ion  represented real p o l i t i c a l  
r isks .
Unlike I n i t i a t i v e  72, broad po l icy  objectives should be delineated 
by the e lec to ra te ,  and the sp e c i f ic  values of a l te rn a t ive  means to reach 
those object ives should be chosen by elected representatives in  a repre­
sentat ive democracy. In th is  sense, the c r i t e r i a  fo r  what const itu tes 
the "best" sp ec i f ic  uses o f  state funds are set by elected representat ives, 
Although the process o f  l e g is la t i v e  appropr iat ions has been shown to be 
grossly inadequate at t i m e s , a n d  there is  no guarantee tha t  the best 
choice w i l l  be made by a le g is la tu re ,  tha t  body is in a be t te r  pos i t ion  
than the e lectora te  to address f i s c a l  issues and make sp ec i f ic  choices.
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The "correctness" o f  those spec i f ic  choices, in the f in a l  analys is ,  is 
determined by Montana voters who u l t im a te ly  assess the responsiveness 
o f  those representatives in d i re c t ing  government a c t i v i t i e s .  Elected 
representatives can be removed from o f f i c e  through the e lectora l  process 
i f  s tate voters should judge them to be unresponsive. Although the state 
bureaucracy possesses the expert ise to render sound f is c a l  decisions, 
the e lectora te  has no d i re c t  e lec to ra l  means to hold the bureaucracy 
accountable fo r  i t s  act ions. The le g is la tu re 's  accoun tab i l i ty  to the 
e lec to ra te  tends to overshadow other de f ic ienc ies  o f  le g is la t i v e  decis ion­
making, and in th is  sense, the le g is la tu re ,  ra ther  than the bureaucracy, 
should engage in the budgetary process. Without tha t  accoun tab i l i ty ,  the 
e lec to ra te 's  in f luence over governmental decisions would be severely 
l im i te d .  Therefore, the de f ic ienc ies  in the e lec to ra te 's  a b i l i t y  to 
render sound decisions on s p e c i f i c ,  complex po l icy  issues, and the lack 
of d i r e c t  means with  which to hold the s ta te  bureaucracy accountable fo r  
i t s  act ions,  places the le g is la tu re  in  the best pos i t ion  to a l loca te  the 
s ta te 's  l im ited  resources.
As the i n i t i a t i v e  process now stands in  Montana state government, the 
i n i t i a t i v e  is  inadequate as a means to al low d i re c t  voter involvement in 
spec i f ic  f i s c a l  po l icy  formula t ion ,  such as the Homestead Re l ie f  Act. 
Although i t  is  s t i l l  on the books, the i n i t i a t i v e  process is not su i tab le  
in cases o f  spe c i f ic  po l icy  fo rmula t ion ,  and u n t i l  the time major re ­
v is ions are designed to remedy the obvious de f ic ienc ies ,  the i n i t i a t i v e  
w i l l  have no leg i t im a te  place in state f i s c a l  decision-making. Although
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the i n i t i a t i v e  process is  unsuitable fo r  spec i f ic  f i s c a l  po l icy  formu­
la t i o n ,  the precedent set by Governor Judge's successful employment of  
the i n i t i a t i v e  may d ic ta te  an increasing use o f  tha t  process fo r  fu ture 
state f i s c a l  policy-making. I t  remains to be seen i f  fu tu re  Montana 
governors w i l l  fo l low  s u i t .
The Homestead R e l ie f  Act represents an instance in which the i n i t i a ­
t i v e  process made an impact on the budgetary process--whether "enlightened" 
or not. This is  unusual in  the United States but is s o l id ly  in  the popu­
l i s t  t r a d i t i o n .  The problem stems from the fac t  tha t  the le g is la tu re 's  
ro le  o f  choosing the sp e c i f ic  means to achieve po l icy  object ives was up­
set.  Through an i n i t i a t i v e  such as the Homestead Re l ie f  Act, the 
e lectora te  indicates spec i f ic  po l icy  desires,  and the le g is la tu re 's  
con tr ibu t ion  is fundamentally a l te red .
The impl icat ions o f  I n i t i a t i v e  72 fo r  public budgeting are obvious. 
While the i n i t i a t i v e  process has long been represented as a bulwark o f  
democracy, the complexi t ies o f  contemporary state government operations 
have raised leg i t im a te  doubt as to the s u i t a b i l i t y  o f  the i n i t i a t i v e  as 
a means to make state f i s c a l  decis ions. The issue involves not merely 
a governor's opportun ity  to  increase leverage w i th in  the state organi­
za t ion ,  but more fundamentally i t  is  a question o f  d i r e c t  c i t i z e n  i n ­
volvement in spe c i f ic  po l icy  choices a f fe c t in g  the f i s c a l  operation of  
the s ta te .  The s tory  o f  the Homestead R e l ie f  Act suggests tha t  in  the 
complexit ies of  contemporary s tate government budgetary processes, the 
i n i t i a t i v e  process is a sacred cow tha t  deserves to be la id  to res t .
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P o l i t i c a l  Impl icat ions
A c o r ro l la r y  issue is  the p o l i t i c a l  consequences o f  actions taken 
by pa r t ic ipan ts  in the h is to ry  o f  the Homestead Re l ie f  Act. I f  the 
measure does not redeem the promises made, those associated with i t s  
sponsorship w i l l  l i k e l y  incur p o l i t i c a l  losses. S im i la r ly ,  should the 
measure be received favorably ,  the sponsors w i l l  benef i t  p o l i t i c a l l y .
I t  remains to be seen j u s t  how well the r e l i e f  plan w i l l  operate and 
what i t s  e f fe c t  w i l l  be on other governmental areas such as the state 
publ ic  school system.
The manner in which the operation o f  the plan is  received involves 
a va r ie ty  o f  var iab les .  The governor portrayed the plan as "the be­
ginning of real property tax r e l i e f  in  Montana", yet  whether that  
confidence is shared by Montana property taxpayers upon rece ip t  o f  the 
r e la t i v e l y  small rebate is  questionable. I t  is  e n t i r e ly  possible tha t  
Montana taxpayers w i l l  perceive tha t  the small rebate does in f a c t ,  as 
c r i t i c i z e d  by opponents, o f fe r  l i t t l e  as fa r  as comprehensive, on-going 
property tax r e l i e f .  The fac t  tha t  the "widespread property tax r e l i e f "  
promised by the governor could be obtained only i f  applied fo r ,  poses 
p o te n t ia l l y  undesirable consequences fo r  the governor since the number 
o f  actual app l ica t ions proved to be s u b s ta n t ia l ly  less than the number 
of  taxpayers e l i g i b l e  to apply. Should the Homestead Re l ie f  Act prove 
in ju r io u s  to count ies '  a b i l i t y  to  fund public schools, i t  w i l l  be i n ­
te res t ing  where the blame is  placed--on the Judge administrat ion or the
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l e g is la tu re .  I t  i s  a f a i r l y  safe assumption tha t  the inc lus ion in the 
funding b i l l  o f  the general-fund surplus l im i ta t io n  provis ion w i l l  tend 
to insure against any unforeseen disastrous consequences. Therefore, 
there probably w i l l  be no disastrous p o l i t i c a l  consequences fo r  e i the r  
the le g is la tu re  or the executive stemming from major defects in the 
r e l i e f  measure. However, an important consideration is tha t  the Home­
stead R e l ie f  Act in a l l  p ro b a b i l i t y  w i l l  not be funded fo r  more than 
the two years o f  the current  biennium--possibly only one. This means 
the s ta te  has not dea l t  w i th  the problems of  the property tax on an on­
going basis. The Homestead R e l ie f  Act represents a rebate plan that 
i s ,  and probably always w i l l  be, dependent upon a state general-fund 
surplus--a dependence that  l im i t s  i t s  impact as a permanent aid to 
property taxpayers. This analysis means simply that  the 1979 Montana 
le g is la tu re  w i l l  be faced again w i th  the re s p o n s ib i l i t y  o f  addressing 
property tax r e l i e f  or property tax reform, and with much less than a 
$50 m i l l i o n  general-fund surplus.
The governor w i l l  absorb the brunt o f  any c r i t ic ism s  i f  the rebate 
is  in terpre ted as not being real property tax r e l i e f .  Although actual 
de f ic ienc ies  o f  the Homestead R e l ie f  Act w i l l  obviously not aid the 
p o l i t i c a l  fu tu re  o f  the governor, Thomas Judge should be able to side­
step any c r i t i c i s m  simply by assert ing tha t  at least  he, as governor, 
attempted to ease the property tax burden o f  Montanans, whatever the 
de f ic ienc ies  o f  his method. This is something the Montana Legis la ture 
never r e a l l y  attempted.
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I t  also is  possible the governor might well have depleted his supply 
o f  p o l i t i c a l  chips over the funding of  the Homestead Re l ie f  Act. Legis­
la to rs  who resented the governor's aggressive tac t ics  during the 45th 
session may choose as a r e ta l i a to r y  gesture to mute th e i r  support fo r  
Thomas Judge in the fu ture .  S t i l l ,  the impact the governor made upon 
the Montana e lectora te  with  his attempt to ease t h e i r  property tax burden 
may compensate fo r  any loss o f  l e g is la t i v e  support.
The governor has p o l i t i c a l l y  gambled w ith  the Homestead Re l ie f  Act, 
and he played the game w e l l ,  adeptly using a l l  o f  his a l lo t te d  moves.
As fa r  as p o l i t i c a l  impl ica t ions fo r  h imself ,  i t  remains to be seen i f  
he made the correct  moves. Thomas Judge chose to make a personal impact 
on the Montana governmental scene. The Homestead Re l ie f  Act became a 
veh ic le  through which the governor could make tha t  impact. Rather than 
assuming a passive gubernatorial p os i t ion ,  Thomas Judge chose an ag­
gressor 's  ro le .  The p o l i t i c a l  stakes are high fo r  Governor Judge, as 
they would be fo r  any governor who a c t ive ly  seeks to inf luence the state 
operation. A governor who chooses to  become the aggressor and in te r j e c t  
personal s ty le  in to  the s ta te  organ izat ion,  increases the success which 
might be derived from the gubernatoria l tenure. Concomitantly, however, 
the governor increases the chances tha t  those actions w i l l  be met with 
negative react ions,  since an ac t ive  ro le  a t t ra c ts  more c r i t i c a l  s c r u t i n i -  
zat ion and engenders opposit ion. A governor who opts fo r  an aggressor's 
ro le  gambles with tha t  choice; i f  he should negotiate the hazards, he 
stands to win the p o l i t i c a l  "pot"  in  a game in  which he "upped the stakes"
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Should he f a i l ,  he stands to  lose much more than had he not chosen an 
aggressor's ro le .  Thomas Judge has upped the stakes; he has ye t  to 
cla im the pot.
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